Extract from report of
the special committee
on the military disasters at Forts Henry
and Donelson and the evacuation of Nashville.
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[ March, 1862.]
Statement of Capt. Jack
Davis, of Texas.
I was in the different battles of Fort Donelson, and belonged to
the outside forces; was captain of Company E, Colonel Gregg's regiment
Texas volunteers. I was in the battles of Thursday, Friday, and
Saturday. Was one of those taken prisoners, but made my escape on
Sunday morning on a flat-boat across the river from Dover. To the
best of my knowledge we were surrendered on Sunday morning between
daylight and sunup.
Some hours before daylight we were aroused from our slumber (which,
by an arrangement of alternation, we were allowed to take) by the
announcement that we were to retreat immediately. In pursuance of
this announcement we immediately took to our line of march, and
had advanced some distance to an open field, when a halt was ordered.
At this order the men became much dissatisfied. It was exceedingly
cold and uncomfortable. We remained in this position until it was
understood that we were surrendered, and we were ordered to march
back to our quarters.
Our regiment belonged to Brigadier-General Clark's brigade; stationed
at Hopkinsville, Ky. We reached Fort Donelson, to the best of my
recollection, on the Monday evening preceding the battle; were in
all the conflicts that occurred outside the fort. The great body
of the soldiers behaved with gallantry and valor, and had the most
implicit confidence in the generals, which I believe the generals
merited.
The enemy commenced the regular attack on Thursday morning, their
infantry assailing us on the right, while their batteries opened
on our left. We had, so far as I am able to form an opinion, about
12,000 altogether, in the fort and outside. The whole body of our
troops was not engaged in the battle of Thursday, reserves having
been kept on the left, and, I suppose, also in the fort and between
the fort and our intrenchments. I will here explain what I mean
by intrenchments. They consisted of small saplings, with which that
country abounds, thrown lengthwise along the outside margin of ditches,
dug some 5 feet wide and 2 feet deep, the dirt having been thrown
upon the saplings, and giving us a protection of about 5 feet. These
ditches extended about 3 miles in length, the whole or the greater
part of the work having been thrown up during the night of Wednesday,
some slight additions and improvements having been completed on
Thursday night.
The locality was most judiciously selected. This line of ditches
was so constructed that it afforded a complete protection to the
fort, which was situated in its rear, except on the water side,
the fort being on the bank of the Cumberland River. The infantry
of both armies mainly conducted the battle on Thursday, the heaviest
fighting having occurred on our right wing, the left being assailed
with shot, shell, and grape from their batteries. Our loss on the
right wing, from the best information I could obtain, amounted to
from 50 to 100 killed, while that of the enemy, as I was informed,
was not less than from 400 to 500 killed and wounded. On the left
wing our loss amounted to from 4 to 6 killed.
On Thursday night I suppose that the various regiments were able,
by alternately relieving each other, to obtain some partial repose,
which was facilitated by having the reserves already referred to.
On Friday morning the fight was renewed about 8 or 9 o'clock, the
battle, as on Thursday, having been chiefly confined to our right
wing, the left being assailed by the enemy's sharpshooters. The
battle continued on Friday between the infantry on both sides until
about noon, resulting in about equal loss on both sides with that
of the preceding day. The fighting on land ceased about noon, and
the gunboats, four in number, opened upon the fort, which returned
the fire, resulting, after a conflict of about one hour and a quarter,
in but little, if any, damage to the fort, while all but one of
the gunboats were disabled. I will be more particular:
The gunboats commenced the assault when about 1 ¼ miles from the
fort, coming up four abreast and, continuing their fire until they
were opposite the fort. The fort kept up a regular fire with guns
of a smaller caliber, evidently reserving the heavy guns until the
gunboats were within a distance of about 150 yards. The effect,
as witnessed by our troops and by the citizens who had gathered
on the hills around Dover, was beyond the power of description.
After having received a shot from a 128-pounder one of the gunboats
rolled towards the opposite bank of the river, silenced, crippled,
and apparently unmanageable; a second soon shared the same fate;
a third was totally disabled; and the fourth, turning her head,
took to a precipitate flight down the river. The excitement at this
time among the military and citizen spectators was intense and almost
wild, the latter testifying their joy by tossing their hats in the
air, and the former by a general huzza, commencing on the right
wing and soon caught up and became universal along the entire line.
With the exception of some random shots from both sides there was
no further fighting on that evening. On that night we received orders
to cook three days' provisions and be ready for marching the next
morning. We did not know whither we were to proceed, but we supposed
in the direction of Fort Henry, to which it was believed the enemy
were retreating.
On Saturday morning the battle was renewed about sunrise, commencing
to-day on our left. At an early hour in the morning we were informed
that we were to attack the enemy. This I regarded as an indiscreet
though a bold movement, as we did not know the force of the enemy
or the number and locality of his batteries.
Three of our regiments commenced the attack on the enemy's right,
and the fight was kept up until they commenced retreating, when
our batteries were brought to bear upon them. We pursued them over
a mile, the regiment to which I belonged having been relieved and
a fresh regiment having taken our place in the pursuit. From the
movements of the enemy this morning I became convinced that when
we can get within a hundred yards of the enemy they will not stand
either a close fight or a charge. The result of to-day's fighting
was much more disastrous to the enemy than on any of the preceding
days, their loss being at least three to one. On each day our army
took prisoners, varying in number.
Another result of to-day's battle was the capture by our troops
of eleven or more pieces of artillery, five of which I know of myself;
the capture of the others I learned from good authority and general
belief. This battle continued until between 11 and 12 o'clock, the
enemy at this time having been driven over a mile--perhaps a mile
and a half--along their camp.
Our army returned, all believing that we had gained a signal victory,
but later in the day the fight was renewed by an attack of the enemy
on our right wing, with results on both sides more disastrous than
at any previous period of the conflict. The disasters on our side
were attributed to the fact that, for some cause unknown to me,
a portion of our forces left their intrenchments, which were immediately
occupied by the enemy. Our greatest loss occurred in connection
with a successful and gallant charge, conducted by General Buckner,
to dislodge the enemy from the intrenchments.
As to the subsequent surrender and the circumstances connected
with it, I have no personal knowledge. We went to rest supposing
ourselves completely victorious, but I was informed by several persons,
especially by some prisoners, that on that night as well as on the
night previous the enemy were re-enforced to an extent that increased
their army to 80,000 men. Meanwhile we received no re-enforcements,
although we had been led to believe that they were on their way
to our relief from Bowling Green.
I have already referred to our movements on Saturday morning. When
the intelligence of our surrender was communicated to the troops
there was a general feeling of indignation, mingled with surprise,
among all. The men were frantic to be permitted to fight their way
out. It is my firm belief said the general impression that had a
re-enforcement of 10,000 men reached us on Sunday morning we could
have held out and secured a decisive victory.
Interrogatory by H. S. Foote. Had the steamer or steamers that
were employed in taking off General Floyd and his command been employed
in removing our men and munitions of war on Saturday night, could
they have done so?
Answer. Yes; two boats could have taken the men and munitions of
war in two hours. The enemy did not come within gunshot distance
of ;he fort until after the surrender. Had some 5,000 men been kept
in the intrenchments even on Sunday morning, we could have transferred
across the river 10,000 men.
JACK DAVIS,
Captain Co. E, Col. John Gregg's Regiment Texas Volunteers
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